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In this paper we examine how remittances relate to the exchange rate, natural disasters and 
foreign aid in developing economies.  By using panel VAR methods we are able to compensate 
for both data limitations and endogeneity among variables.  We find that while foreign aid tends 
to appreciate the real exchange rate, remittances do not have the same impact.  We also detect an 
inverse relationship between the real exchange rate and remittance amounts, with real exchange 
rate depreciation increasing remittance inflows.  Of particular interest is the observation that the 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) subsample of countries behave differently from the full 
sample of Developing Countries (DC) in a number of ways.  Of note is the differing impact of 
disaster shocks on the real exchange rate and on the level of remittances across the two samples.   
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A.   Introduction 
 
  In 1970, about 2.2 percent of the world’s population lived in a country other than their 
country of birth.  In contrast, by 2000, the foreign born accounted for close to 3 percent of the 
world’s population (International Organization for Migration 2005, p. 379).  International 
migration has spurred public interest not only on account of its continued growth, but also due to 
observed changes in its spread; in the geographic origin and socioeconomic status of migrants 
(Williamson 2006).  This has lead to spirited discussions of the economic impact of immigration 
for in-migration areas.   
  But a parallel discussion is now taking place that focuses on the various ways in which 
out-migration affects migrant-sending regions of the world.  Some of these impacts are thought 
to be negative, whereas others are deemed positive.  For example, brain drain may disadvantage 
migrant-sending regions by reducing the availability of high skill human capital where it is 
sorely needed, thus questioning the domestic effectiveness of public expenditures on higher 
education (Haque and Kim 1995).  However, monetary inflows remitted by migrants to their 
families and friends back home may make up for these downsides, providing needed infusions of 
financial capital in poor areas of the world (Lucas 2007).  Moreover, in the last decade, 
international remittances have grown at a faster pace than their respective migration flows.  
While world wide remittance inflows amounted to US $68 billion in 1990, this sum increased by 
about three and a half times to $232 billion by 2005 (World Bank 2006).  In contrast the total 
world stock of migrants rose by only 23 percent -- from 155 million to 190 million over the same 
time period.
1
                                                 
1 See United Nations. World Migrant Stock:  The 2005 Revised Population Database at http://esa.un.org/migration/. 
  2  A secular decline in transportation and telecommunication costs is likely partly 
responsible for the upward trends that we observe in both migration and in monetary remittances.  
If migrants can visit home more frequently and if they can more easily keep in touch with their 
families in their communities of origin, they may remit more often, in greater amounts and for 
longer periods of time.  This observed rise in transnationalism prompted by technological 
innovations in transportation and telecommunications is likely to enhance the importance of 
continued out-migration and remittance inflows to migrant sending communities.   
  Another factor that has sometimes been mentioned as a potential reason for rising 
migration and its accompanying financial flows is a rise in the effects of extreme events around 
the globe.  It is not an increased incidence of natural disasters that lies behind the growing 
importance of extreme events, but rather the growth in the number of individuals affected by 
such disasters (see EM-DAT: The International Disaster Database).  Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) are, in particular, more vulnerable to natural disasters for a number of reasons, 
including the geographic concentration of their populations in coastal areas (UNESCO/World 
Bank 2003).  This increased vulnerability may contribute toward increased out-migration and 
remittance inflows.     
  Despite these hypotheses regarding the causes behind the observed increase in 
remittances, very little is known about SIDS out-migration and remittance-receiving patterns.  
This paper explores the effects of migratory patterns on migrant-sending communities via the 
impacts of subsequent remittance inflows.  In particular, we trace how workers’ remittances are 
linked to other macroeconomic variables thought to either determine or be driven by remittance 
inflows, specifically natural disasters, official foreign aid flows, and the real exchange rate.   
  3  We focus on SIDS due to the well-documented economic and environmental 
vulnerabilities of these economies.  In this regard, Briguglio (1995) reports that SIDS 
vulnerabilities stem from their small size, lack of product diversification, economic openness, 
import dependence and remoteness.  Their small size curtails diversification and the attainment 
of economies of scale in the production of goods and services.  Their vulnerability to natural 
disasters coupled with their small size usually makes these economies more import dependent.  
They are more susceptible to outside shocks –a characteristic further emphasized by their remote 
location and relatively high transportation costs.   
  In such a context, it is important to evaluate the impact of remittances on these economies 
and, in particular, their potential for reducing the economic vulnerability of SIDS.  Remittances 
can positively impact economic development by serving as a source of foreign exchange.  For 
instance, remittances can be used to finance business investments (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2006a, Woodruff and Zenteno 2006) and the acquisition of human capital via the increased 
schooling of children (Edwards and Ureta 2003, Hanson and Woodruff 2003, Gitter and Barham 
2005).  However, remittances have the potential to negatively impact recipient nations.  Inflows 
of foreign exchange can appreciate the real exchange rate, potentially putting export industries at 
a disadvantage in world markets.  Alternatively, remittances can create work disincentives 
(Funkhouser 1992, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006b).  These concerns parallel those expressed 
in the macroeconomic literature on official aid and its effectiveness on economic growth (e.g. 
Dollar and Burnside 2002, as well as Pavlov and Sugden 2006 for Pacific Islands).  
  While remittances have the potential to impact household behavior in ways that will 
affect the performance of the economy, detailed microeconomic data useful for testing these 
propositions are often lacking for SIDS.  For this reason, we focus our attention on the 
  4determinants and impacts of remittances at the macro-economic level.  Specifically, we address 
three sets of questions.  First, we ask: what factors drive remittance inflows?  How responsive 
are remittances to natural disasters?  How responsive are remittance senders to ongoing foreign 
aid flows?  How do private and public transfers compare?  Do remittances respond more quickly 
to the needs of individuals in the homeland following a natural disaster?  Secondly, we focus on 
how remittances relate to other macroeconomic variables.  Since remittances have become an 
increasingly important source of global development finance (e.g. Terry and Wilson 2005), some 
have suggested that these monetary inflows may substitute for official foreign aid.
2  Therefore, 
we ask whether official donors consider remittance receipts when deciding on official aid 
amounts.  Finally, we inquire about the impact of remittance inflows on the real exchange rate 
and ask whether remittances cause “Dutch Disease”.  Do remittances appreciate the real 
exchange rate thereby disadvantaging export industries which compete in world markets?   
  In what follows, we provide a description of the data sources.  Subsequently, we discuss 
the methodology employed in our analysis and our findings for SIDS and for a wider range of 
economies.  A final section summarizes our results and provides suggestions for further research.   
B.    Data 
  In order to address the aforementioned questions, we work with panel data on workers’ 
remittances, natural disasters, official foreign aid, and the real exchange rate.  The data runs from 
1990 through 2003.  Annual data on workers’ remittances and official development assistance 
(both in U.S. current dollars) were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
                                                 
2 For example, see the discussion at ERCOG, available at: 
http://www.ercof.org/dbase/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=27 
  5Disaster costs (in current U.S. dollars) were downloaded from the disaster database EM-DAT.
3  
Multilateral real effective exchange rates were acquired from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS).  Unfortunately, IFS only publishes real effective exchange rate indexes for less than half 
of the countries used in the analysis.  The remaining effective index series were obtained from 
various other sources as specified in the data appendix.  For countries lacking a real effective 
exchange rate index, we constructed one by determining the top trading partners of the country in 
question and then computing an un-weighted average real exchange rate index.
4  Finally, 
remittances, foreign aid, and disaster costs –all in current U.S. dollars– are standardized by 
dividing each by its GDP expressed in current U.S. dollars (also obtained from WDI).  
  One concern is whether the remittances series that we employ are reliable.  Since most 
central banks and national statistical agencies have viewed these inflows as minor, they tended to 
place less effort in accurately tracking them.  As a result, it is generally understood that the time 
series of remittances underreport true flows.  We do not have a good solution to this 
mismeasurement data problem.  We recognize that while mismeasurement in dependent 
variables is less problematic, mismeasurement of explanatory variables can seriously 
compromise and bias one’s estimates.  However, the use of panel methods with country fixed 
effects may lessen these issues as long as the underreporting pattern is constant overtime within 
each country.   
  On account of data availability, only 19 of the 37 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
are included in the analysis.
5  These are Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, 
                                                 
3 This is the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database - www.em-dat.net - Université Catholique de Louvain, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
4 See the data appendix for details regarding the source and method of derivation of the exchange rate index by 
country.  For "dollarized" economies, real exchange rates are constructed as domestic to foreign price ratios. 
5 The total member list is available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/sid/list.htm 
  6Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu.  For the most part, lack 
of data on workers’ remittances is what prevented us from including the other island states.  For 
the group of SIDS studied in this paper, aid as a share of GDP runs at about 10 percent, while 
workers’ remittances accounts for close to 5 percent of GDP. 
C.  Data Transformation and Methodology 
  We face two additional challenges when conducting the empirical analysis.  First, 
macroeconomic data on SIDS are scarce.  There are no long macroeconomic time series for these 
countries and the data are typically reported at relatively low frequencies (i.e. annually).  A 
second challenge, common to most macroeconomic studies, is endogeneity.   Most 
macroeconomic series are endogenous making it difficult to accurately discern causal 
relationships.  To overcome these two challenges we estimate panel data vector autoregressive 
models (panel VARs).  
  The use of a panel VAR addresses the endogeneity problem as the methodology treats all 
the variables in the system as endogenous.  Moreover, the panel VAR also helps us overcome a 
data limitation problem by stacking the data from various countries.  An added advantage of the 
panel VAR is that it allows us to take into account unobserved country specific heterogeneity.  
This is extremely important in our analysis given the diversity of countries in our sample with 
regards to location and size, among other characteristics.  As such, the use of panel VARs seems 
appropriate for our analysis.  In fact, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) show that panel data are perfectly 
fitted for VARs as few years of data are required to estimate such models.  This is possible 
because the sampling properties depend on the number of countries (i) and not on the number of 
years (t).  Some authors even argue that the asymptotic results are easier to derive for panel data 
  7than for time series data (see Gilchrist and Himelberg 1998).  In what follows, we provide a short 
description of the methodology used in this analysis.
6
 The  equation of a 1 lag panel VAR can be written as: 
th l
l l l l l
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' γ α ,          ( 1 )  
where   is the country specific effect,   is the year specific effect,   is an   vector of 
lagged endogenous variables,   is an   vector of slope coefficients, and   is the 
idiosyncratic error.  In order to eliminate year and country fixed effects, we make two 
transformations.  First, we express all variables in the model as deviations from year specific 
means to remove year specific effects (i.e. the data are time demeaned).  Second, we transform 
all variables in the model to deviations from forward means (Helmert’s transformation) to 
remove fixed effects.  Since country specific effects are correlated with the regressors ( ) by 
virtue of the lag dependent variable, the mean differencing procedure commonly used to 
eliminate these fixed effects will create biased coefficients (Love and Zicchino 2006).  To avoid 
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6 The empirical analysis is conducted using the package provided in Love (2001). 
  8where  ) 1 /( ) ( + − − = t T t T i i it δ  and   denotes the last year of data available for a given 
country series.  We are not able to calculate this transformation for the last year of data, since 
there are no future values for the construction of the forward means.  Accordingly, we lose this 
observation.  The final transformed model is thus given by: 
i T
l l l
it it it e b x y ~ ~ ~ ' + = .           ( 5 )  
  Thus, we used an orthogonal deviation, in which we express each observation as a 
deviation of average future observations.  We weight each observation to standardize the 
variance.  If the original errors are not autocorrelated and have a constant variance, the 
transformed errors should exhibit similar properties.  Thus, this transformation preserves 
homocedasticity and does not induce serial correlation (Arellano and Bover 1995).  Additionally, 
we use lagged regressors as instruments in our GMM estimation.  To the extent that the 
instruments are lagged values of  , they remain uncorrelated with the transformed error term --  
that is, 
it x
[ ] 0 ~ = −
l
it s it e x E  for all s ≥ 0 (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988, Gilchrist and Himelberg 1998).  
Once we have estimated all coefficients of the panel VAR, we proceed to estimate 
variance decompositions (VDCs) and impulse response functions (IRFs).  VDCs inform us on 
the portion of the forecast error variance for each variable that is attributable to its own 
innovations and to innovations from the other variables in the system.  The IRFs further inform 
on the sign and time trajectory of the impact of a one standard deviation shock to one of the 
variables in the system on the outcome of interest. 
We initially estimate the model for the small sample of SIDS mentioned earlier.  
However, we also work with a large sample of countries that includes the SIDS as well as 92 
developing economies giving us a sample containing 111 countries.  We label this second 
sample: the DC sample.  The rationale for obtaining this second sample rests with the limited 
  9number of observations that we have for the SIDS sample which in turn prevents us from 
computing confidence intervals for the IRFs.  With the DC sample, we can compute a two 
standard deviation confidence interval band for the IRFs.  These are obtained using 1,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations.  This estimation provides us with additional information for assessing how the 
macroeconomic variables relate to one another.   
Finally, a few words regarding the ordering of the series in our model is in order.  In 
order to compute VDCs and IRFs, the residuals must be orthogonalized.  We use a recursive 
ordering to orthogonalize the residuals.  The assumption behind such ordering is that series listed 
earlier in the ordering impact other variables contemporaneously, while series listed later in the 
ordering impact those listed earlier only with lags.  Consequently, variables listed earlier in the 
ordering are considered to be more exogenous.  In our case, it is natural to list the disaster series 
at the beginning of the ordering.  Natural disasters can have immediate impacts on foreign aid, 
the real exchange rate and remittances, but natural disasters are not likely to be propagated by 
contemporaneous shocks to these same variables.  Next in the ordering is foreign aid, typically 
responsive to ongoing disasters.  The real exchange rate index follows.  Remittances are placed 
last in the ordering.   The rationale for listing the real exchange before remittances is that 
remitters appear to be cognizant and responsive to current  exchange rate movements, factoring 
in ongoing exchange rate conditions when remitting home (e.g. Faini 1994, Hysenbegasi and 
Pozo 2006).  While it is also possible that the real exchange rate responds to remittance inflows 
as posited in models of Dutch Disease, those responses take place with a lag.
7  As such, the final 
ordering is: disaster costs, foreign aid, the real exchange rate index and remittances. 
                                                 
7 The mechanism by which remittances might affect the real exchange rate is via their differential impact on 
spending on traded versus non-traded goods in the recipient economy.  For example, if remittances are mainly spent 
on non-traded goods, domestic prices will eventually be bid up, causing an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
  10D.  Results 
We report on two sets of results using two samples of data: the DC and SIDS samples.  
We can make inferences about the dynamic relationships among the variables in our VAR 
systems from VDCs and IRFs.  The VDCs for each of the samples are displayed in Table 1.  The 
top panel of Table 1 contains the VDCs for the larger sample of DC countries.  Up to 22 percent 
of the forecast error variance of remittances is explained by innovations to the real exchange rate, 
disaster and foreign aid series when we use the DC sample.  Furthermore, remittances explain 
about 14 percent of the forecast variance of each of the other variables in the system.  Using the 
smaller sample of SIDS (lower panel of Table 1), we find that, after 10 periods, only 2.4 percent 
of remittances’ error forecast variance can be explained by innovations in the real exchange rate, 
foreign aid and disaster costs.  Yet, remittances explain as much as 27.5 percent of foreign aid’s 
error forecast variance.  This suggests that remittances can play an important role in affecting the 
macro-economies of SIDS and developing economies in general.  These findings underscore the 
need to gain a better understanding of the determinants and impact of remittances in SIDS and 
DC countries.  Therefore, we also examine the IRFs from the VAR models using the two 
samples.   
Figure 1 (panels A through D) display the IRFs corresponding to the panel VAR model  
estimated for the DC sample of countries.  Subsequently, we restrict our analysis to SIDS and 
display those results in Figure 2.  As noted earlier, we are no longer able to compute confidence 
interval bands for the IRFs in the SIDS subsample due to the limited sample size.   
What are the major findings from our analysis?  Focusing on the DC sample first, the 
figures in Panel A, Figure 1, show how a one standard deviation shock to the disaster series 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, it is likely that prices exhibit some stickiness resulting in a lag between spending changes and real 
appreciation. 
  11results in a significant and long-lasting increase (4 years) in foreign aid flows.  Likewise, a 
disaster shock is accompanied by a real exchange rate appreciation, perhaps owing to the 
pressure placed on domestic prices following disasters.  Yet, the real exchange rate seems to 
quickly adjust (by year 2) to its long run equilibrium value.  In contrast with what we observe for 
foreign aid and the exchange rate, remittance inflows drop following a disaster.  Such behavior is 
interesting and could be explained by interruptions to the regular money transfer channels by 
which migrants send money home.  Alternatively, migrants may choose to take a ‘wait and see’ 
attitude before remitting funds home to fully assess the situation and needs of family following 
disasters.   
Panel B in Figure 1 displays the response of all variables to a one standard deviation 
shock to foreign aid.  According to these plots, there is evidence of foreign aid flows causing 
“Dutch Disease” as the real exchange rate appreciates following a shock to the foreign aid series.  
The impact on the exchange rate dissipates three years after the shock.  Additionally, it is 
interesting to note how remittance inflows drop following an increase in foreign aid.  In this 
regard, migrants appear to be factoring in public aid flows in their remitting patterns, reducing 
private flows when there is an increase in public money flows to their home economies.  Why 
might remittances respond in this way?  One possibility is that shocks to foreign aid take place 
during periods of major political and economic crisis.  During periods of  turmoil, non-altruistic 
remitters may cut back on their flows to the home community, not because they are reacting 
directly to increased flows by international organizations and governments, but rather because 
they may view the time as inopportune for additional investments in the home community.  
Indeed, if one’s objective in remitting is to build a portfolio of assets in the home community, 
  12periods of economic crisis back home are not likely to invite such investments.  Instead, 
individuals are more likely to remit when exposure to economic risks are smaller. 
How do changes in the exchange rate impact remittances?  There is some evidence that 
remitters respond to depreciation in exchange rates by remitting more (Faini 1994, Hysenbegasi 
and Pozo 2006, Vargas-Silva and Pozo 2006).  Exchange rate depreciations permit the remitter to 
buy more home currency with a given level of host currency.  If the altruistic remitter cares about 
her/his family receiving a specific lump-sum of money in the home currency, s/he will be able to 
accomplish that goal with a smaller remittance outflow of money in host country currency.  This 
income effect, however, is counteracted by a substitution effect according to which depreciation 
lowers the relative price of goods in the home country, driving the remitter to send more in order 
to take advantage of the difference in relative prices.  Hence, whether the remitter remits more or 
less boils down to whether the income versus the substitution effect dominates.  In this analysis, 
it appears that the substitution effect is greater as we observe remittances increasing (decreasing) 
following exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) in Figure 1, Panel C.   
Figure 2 displays the IRFs using the SIDS sub-sample.  Owing to the reduced number of 
observations, we are unable to compute confidence interval bands for the IRFs.  Yet, by 
comparing the figures to those obtained using the larger sample of countries, we are able to make 
some inferences regarding the similarities and dissimilarities between SIDS and other 
economies.  Panel A of Figure 2 shows the impact of a one standard deviation shock to the 
disaster variable on foreign aid, the real exchange rate and remittances.  As with the larger 
sample, foreign aid sharply rises during the first year following a disaster shock, declining 
thereafter.  However, the real exchange rate, which used to briefly appreciate in response to a 
disaster shock with the larger sample of countries, now seems to depreciate.  This behavioral 
  13response is interesting and may be reflecting capital flight or loss of confidence in the longer run 
economic well-being of the island, leading to a weakening of the home currency.  Finally, unlike 
what we found with the larger sample of countries, remittances now rise following a disaster 
shock.  In this regard, emigrants from SIDS appear to be more altruistic.   
Panel B of Figure 2 further inform on the effect that foreign aid shocks may have on 
remittances and the real exchange rate.  The real exchange rate appreciates following an increase 
in foreign aid flows.  Therefore, we encounter further evidence of a possible “Dutch Disease- 
like" effect of aid with the smaller sample of SIDS.  Additionally, as with the larger sample of 
countries, migrants appear to reduce their remittance flows home following an increase in 
foreign aid.  Nonetheless, unlike earlier, this reduction in remittance flows only seems to 
accentuate –instead of vanishing– over time, possibly reflecting the greater vulnerability of SIDS 
economies, which take longer to recover from economic crises.  
Panel C of Figure 2 displays how exchange rates affect the variables in our system.  
Appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces remittances (or depreciation encourages 
remittances).  Therefore, it appears that remitters in SIDS behave similarly to those from the 
overall set of DC economies.  The substitution effect overrides the income effect causing 
remittances to fall (rise) with appreciation (depreciation). 
Finally, Panel D of Figure 2 inform on the macroeconomic impact of remittance inflows 
in the case of SIDS.  While the absence of confidence interval estimates prevent us from 
determining whether the responses are statistically different from zero, it is interesting to note 
that an increase in remittance inflows seem to be causing depreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate with recovery after a period of 3 years.  The possibility exists that remittances are 
  14primarily consumed on traded versus non-traded goods in the case of SIDS, raising the relative 
price of traded goods and causing a depreciation of the real exchange rate.       
      In sum, remittance inflows do not seem to be as responsive as foreign aid flows to 
disaster shocks.  While foreign aid flows always increase following a disaster, remittances 
decrease for a short time period when the DC sample of countries is used.  Yet, migrant 
remittances rise after a disaster shock among SIDS, perhaps signaling the lesser disruption of 
money transferring channels in these economies.  Alternatively, remittances may be more stable 
in SIDS, owing to greater family dependence on these monetary flows and a greater degree of 
altruism among migrants from these economies.  In any case, it is worth noting that in both the 
DC and SIDS samples remitters appear to be responding to other sources of aid, reducing their 
monetary transfers in the event of an increase in foreign aid.  In these cases, it may be that 
remitters are actually responding to overall economic conditions back home, which happen to be 
correlated to aid flows.  Finally, while remittances do not seem to have much of an impact on the 
real exchange rate when the larger sample of countries is used, they may cause real exchange 
rate depreciation among SIDS.  The decline in the real exchange rate following a remittance 
shock could be due to the manner in which the inflows are used by the receiving families.  If 
families are using remittances to consume traded goods, we could observe a relative increase in 
the price of traded versus non-traded goods, resulting in real exchange rate depreciation.  In this 
regard, only foreign aid flows seem to cause a "Dutch disease-like" real exchange rate 
appreciation.   
  15E. Robustness  Checks 
  As in any macroeconomic analysis, we are faced with making decisions regarding the 
appropriate variables to use in the analysis.  One might, therefore, wonder whether the results 
would differ if alternative series of macroeconomic variables were used instead.  In particular, it 
is not unreasonable to be skeptical of the results on account of using estimated U.S. dollar 
damages as our variable for tracking the intensity of natural disasters.  While these dollar figures 
are scaled by the GDP of the recipient nation,
8 it is still the case that questions can arise 
regarding the methodology involved in deriving those annual dollar values as they are 
necessarily estimated.  Do those values truly measure the magnitude of disaster?  We have 
therefore estimated our model again using an alternative variable –one that tracks the number of 
persons affected by the natural disaster.  This variable is scaled by the population of that country 
at that time. The IRFs from the estimations using the number of persons affected are nearly 
identical to the ones derived using the U.S. dollar damages scaled by GDP.
9  Foreign aid 
increases and the real exchange rate appreciate when there is a shock to the numbers of persons 
affected by a natural disaster, while remittances decrease for a period of time following the 
natural disaster shock.  Examination of all the other relationships captured by the panel VAR 
remain unaffected by the change in the disaster variable.  Shocks to aid appreciate the real 
exchange rate, while at the same time depressing remittances in the full sample.  Exchange rate 
depreciation, on the other hand, is found to encourage remittances, as before. 
  Another robustness check involves the real exchange rate.  In an attempt to preserve as 
many observations as possible, we constructed a real exchange rate indexes for countries lacking 
                                                 
8 Recall, we divided the U.S. dollar damages series by the GDP of the country to account for the relative magnitude 
of the disaster series. 
9 These IRF plots are available upon request from the authors.     
  16published series.  We used information regarding main trading partners along with bilateral 
exchange rates and price indexes to construct these series.
10    For a number of countries, 
however, information on trading partners was not available, preventing us from using this 
methodology to obtain a real effective index.  In these cases (19 countries in total) we simply 
constructed real bilateral exchange rates vis-a- vis the US dollar.  To assess the suitability of this 
substitution we re-estimated our VARs for the full sample using only countries for which an 
effective real exchange rate was available or could be constructed from available data.  This 
reduces the number of countries in our sample to 92 from 111.  IRFs in the smaller sample of 
DCs are similar to the results in the larger sample of DCs
11.  Only one difference is detected -- 
the impact on remittances stemming from a shock to the disaster series.  In the larger (111 
countries) sample, we found that remittances fall.  In the smaller (92 countries) sample, 
remittances still fall with shocks to the disaster series, but the confidence interval is too wide to 
conclude that the fall is statistically different from zero.  It is possible that the smaller sample 
size contributes to the finding of a lack of significance.  However, overall, we conclude that our 
results appear fairly robust to differing data series.   
F.  Summary and Questions for Future Research   
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study.  First, there is some evidence that 
the macroeconomic behavior of SIDS economies differ from those of overall DC economies.  
This conclusion is derived from comparisons of VDCs and IRFs from the full sample and the 
SIDS subsample of countries included in our analysis. One area of future research would be to 
examine the sources of these differences, possibly related to the fact that remittances account for 
                                                 
10 See the data appendix.   
11 Plots of the IRF are available upon request from the authors.   
  17about 5 percent of GDP in the SIDS subsample, while they only account for about 2.5 percent of 
GDP in the DC sample.   
  A second noteworthy finding is that remittances do not cause Dutch Disease in our 
sample of countries.  We do not observe appreciation of the real exchange rate in response to 
remittance inflows.  This is interesting in light of the finding by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2004) with respect to a group of Latin American economies where Dutch Disease appears to be 
the norm.  Instead, we find that, in the overall DC sample, remittances have no impact on the real 
exchange rate, while they seem to depreciate the real exchange rate in the SIDS sub-sample.
12  
Perhaps remittances are used differently in SIDS versus non-SIDS countries.  Differences in 
spending patterns may result in a differential impact on the real exchange rate owing to the 
impact on the relative prices of tradables and non-tradables.  Therefore, in order to get a better 
understanding of the long-term (and short-term) impacts of migration and remittances, it is 
important to uncover whether there are differences in spending patterns across recipient nations 
on account of these inflows.  Microeconomic studies can help quantify whether those differences 
exist and, in that manner, contribute towards a better understanding of the long-term impacts of 
remittances.   
  We find it interesting that remittances respond to foreign aid, while foreign aid does not 
respond to remittances.  The fear that official donors will stem back on their contributions on 
account of observations that private funds are flowing in, is not borne out in this data.  We do 
note, however, that private donors do appear to “hold back” on remitting in response to increases 
in official foreign aid.  It is not clear why this should be the case.  If shocks to foreign aid flows 
are propagated by natural and economic extreme events, it may be that individual remitters are 
                                                 
12 Recall, since we cannot assign confidence interval estimates to the IRFs of the SIDS sub-sample, we do not know 
whether the finding of real depreciation is statistically significant in the SIDS sub-sample.   
  18unable to remit due to interruptions in money transfer mechanisms, underscoring the need for 
public transfers that do not depend on those channels to get resources to needy areas.  An 
alternative explanation rests with the recognition that remitters have various motives for sending 
money home.  Some remit for altruistic purposes, to help support family back home, while others 
do so to attain specific “investment goals.”  It is conceivable that remittances fall in response to 
economic crises because investment minded remitters stem their flows during these crisis 
periods.  This could explain why remittances decline with foreign aid shocks as these flows are 
likely to be propelled by economic crises.  These possibilities deserve additional scrutiny.  
Microeconomic studies can help sort out these differences in behavioral responses.     
  Finally, disaster shocks elicit increases in remittances in the SIDS sample, whereas the 
opposite effect is observed in the case of the DC sample.  There are various potential 
explanations for this finding.  It could be that SIDS experience a lesser disruption of money 
transfers than the economies included in the DC sample.  Alternatively, while the incidence of 
non-zero disaster costs is greater in the DC sample than in the SIDS sample (i.e. 25 percent 
versus 12 percent, respectively), it is possible that the impact of such disasters are felt harder in 
the group of countries included in the SIDS sample than in their counterparts in the DC sample 
owing to the greater geographic isolation  and vulnerability of these economies.  As such, SIDS 
remitters appear more likely to respond to the disaster by raising their remittance flows.  Finally, 
the purposes for which remitters are sending money back home may vary between the two 
samples.  It is possible that the SIDS contains a larger number of migrants remitting money 
home for pure altruistic purposes, whereas in the DC sample a larger fraction of remitters are 
sending money back home for “investment” purposes or to build a retirement nest-egg.  It would 
be of interest to explore the validity of these various explanations in future research.     
  19  Overall, our findings point to the need for continued research into understanding the 
economic relationships that exists between remittances and other macroeconomic variables.  
While we do observe certain patterns, our methods are limited in their ability to capture the basis 
for these patterns.  Microeconomic methods could be put to use to clarify what lies behind these 
patterns.  We also detect differences in the relationships across SIDS and DC economies.  Once 
again, alternative methodologies need to be employed to sort out the basis for those variations in 
behavior.  Finally, we need to acknowledge that data improvements could go a long way toward 
resolving some of the ambiguities in our results.   
 
    
  20Bibliography 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Susan Pozo.  2004.  “Workers’ Remittances and the Real 
Exchange Rate:  A Paradox of Gifts” World Development, 32(8): 1407-1417.  
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Susan Pozo.  2006a   “Remittance Receipt and Business 
Ownership in the Dominican Republic,” World Economy, 29(7):  939-956.. 
 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Susan Pozo.  2006b.  “Migration, Remittances and Male and 
Female Employment Patterns” American Economic Review, 96(2): 222-226. 
 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O.  1995.  “Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error 
component models” Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29-51. 
 
Briguglio, Lino.  1995.  “Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities,” 
World Development, 23(9): 1615-32. 
 
Carment, David,  Stewart Press and Yiagadeesen Samy.  2006.  “Assessing the Fragility of Small 
Island Developing States,” in  Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., and Kisanga E. J. (eds) Building the 
Economic Resilience of Small States, Malta. 
 
Edwards, Alejandra Cox and Manuelita Ureta.  2003.  “International Migration, Remittances, 
and Schooling:  Evidence from El Salvador” Journal of Development Economics, Special Issue, 
72(2): 429-61. 
 
EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database  www.em-dat.net/ 
 
ERCOG   http://www.ercof.org/dbase/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=27) 
 
Faini, Ricardo. 1994. “Workers Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A Quantitative 
Framework” Journal of Population Economics, 7(2), 235 – 245. 
 
Funkhouser, Edward.  1992.  “Migration from Nicaragua:  Some Recent Evidence” World 
Development, 20(8): 1209-1218. 
 
Gilchrist, Simon and Himmelber, Charles. 1998. “Investment, fundamentals and finance” NBER 
working paper 6652. 
 
Gitter, Seth R. and Bradford L. Barham.  2005.  “Credit, Natural Disasters, Coffee, and 
Education Attainment in Rural Honduras,” Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison working paper. 
 
Haque, Nadeem U. and Si-Jik Kim.  1995.  “Human Capital Flight”: Impact of Migration on 
Income and Growth” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 42(3): 577-607. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H., and Christopher Woodruff.  2003.  “Emigration and Educational Attainment 
in Mexico” University of California, San Diego, mimeo. 
  21 
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Newey, Whitney and Harvey S. Rosen.  1988.  “Estimating vector 
autoregressions with panel data” Econometrica, 56(6): 1371-1395.  
 
Hysenbegasi Alketa and Susan Pozo.  2006. “Workers’ Remittances and Currency Crises,” Well-
being and Social Policy Journal/Bienestar y Política Social, forthcoming. 
 
International Organization for Migration.  2005.  World Migration Report 2005:  Costs and 
Benefits of International Migration (Geneva:  International Organization for Migration), p. 379. 
 
Love, Inessa and Zicchino, Lea. 2006. “Financial development and dynamic investment 
behavior: Evidence from a panel VAR” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46, 
190 – 210. 
 
Love, Inessa. 2001. Estimating Panel-data Autoregressions, Package of Programs for Stata. 
Columbia University, Mimeo. 
 
Lucas, Robert E. B. 2007. “International Migration and Economic Development in Low Income 
Countires:  Lessons from Recent Data,” in International Migrants and their International Money 
Flows, edited by Susan Pozo, (Kalamazoo, MI:  Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) 
forthcoming.   
 
Povlov, Vlad and Craig Sugden.  2006.  “Aid and Growth in the Pacific Islands” Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature, 20(2): pp. 38-55. 
 
Terry, Donald F. and Steven R. Wilson, editors.  2005.  Beyond Small Change:  Making Migrant 
Remittances Count, Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
UNESCO/World Bank.  2003.  “Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy”. 
 
Williamson, Jeffrey G.  2006.  “Global Migration” Finance and Development, 43(2).  
 
Woodruff, Christopher and Rene Zenteno.  2006.  “Migration Networks and Microenterprises in 
Mexico, Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming. 
 
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, 2006:  Economic Implications of Remittances and 
Migration, (Washington D.C.:  World Bank) 2006. 
 
Younger, Stephen D., 1992, “Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When 
Everybody Loves You,” World Development, Vol. 20 (November), pp. 1587–97. 
 
Vargas-Silva, Carlos  and Susan Pozo . 2006. “Do Immigrants and Their Remittances Respond 
to the Exchange Rate?”  mimeo, September 10, 2006. 
 
  22Table 1 
Variance Decompositions after 10 Periods 
Percentage of the Variance Explained by 
Disaster Aid  Exchange  Rate  Remittances  Variables 
A. DC sample. 
Disaster  85.11 0.22  0.86 13.81 
Foreign aid  4.41 78.53 2.19 14.86 
Exchange Rate  3.10 1.56  81.02  14.32 
Remittances  5.44 8.41 8.33  77.82 
  B. SIDS sample. 
Disaster  87.53 0.13  0.34 12.00 
Foreign aid  5.21 66.35 0.96 27.48 
Exchange Rate  0.08 0.46  97.31  2.15 


























  23Figure 1 - DC Sample. Variables included: Disaster, Aid, Exchange Rates and Remittances. 
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Panel D – Response to a shock in Remittances. 
 
Note: Confidence intervals are computed via Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 draws. Ranges represent two standard deviation 
confidence intervals. The shock corresponds to one standard deviation.
  24Figure 2 - SIDS Sample. Variables included: Disaster, Aid, Exchange Rate and Remittances. 
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25 Data Appendix  
 
 




SIDS  Small Island Developing States   176  19 
DC Developing  countries    1023  111 
Master Database:   
All countries classified as low income, lower middle income and upper middle income in the 
2005 World Development Indicators (WDI) database were considered of interest.  WDI classifies 
154 countries as such and all are listed in the table below.  Data from 1990 through 2004 for 
workers remittances, GDP, and official development assistance were extracted fromWDI.  Next, 
data from EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database was appended detailing the total 
estimated US dollar value of disasters taking place in each of the years.  Finally, if a real 
effective exchange rate index was available, it was merged into the master database.   
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index:   
The International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) was consulted for 
series on real effective exchange rates (REER).  These were merged onto the master data set 
when available.  For those countries without an REER in IFS, other sources were consulted.  The 
table below specifies those sources for countries lacking REER in IFS.  When a real effective 
exchange rate series could not be found either in IFS or elsewhere, the authors constructed a 
REER series on their own.  Bilateral real exchange rates for each country’s major trading 
partners were averaged together to compute a series.  The final column of the table below details 
the sources for the information on trading partners necessary to construct an effective real 
exchange rate series.  In cases where it was not possible to obtain trading partner information, a 
real U.S. dollar/local currency bilateral exchange rate index was substituted. The bilateral 









Source for REER or information 
regarding trading partners 
      
Antigua and Barbuda       
Bahamas, The       
Belize x  x  IFS 
Cape Verde  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Comoros x  x   
Cuba      
Dominica      
Dominican Republic  x  x  IFS 
Fiji      
Grenada      
Guyana x  x  IFS 
Haiti  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Jamaica x  x  IFS 
  26Kiribati x  x  www.focuseconomics.com.au 
Maldives  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Marshall Islands       
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.       
Mauritius  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Palau      
Papua New Guinea  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Samoa x  x  IFS 
Sao Tome and Principe       
Singapore      
St. Kitts and Nevis       
St. Lucia       
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines      
Seychelles  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Solomon Islands  x  x  IFS 
Suriname  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Timor-Leste      
Tonga  x  x  UN (for trade partners) 
Trinidad and Tobago  x  x  IFS 
Vanuatu x  x  www.focuseconomics.com.au 
Guinea-Bissau      
Barbados x  x  www.utal.org 
Afghanistan      
Albania   x   
Algeria   x  IFS 
American Samoa       
Angola   x   
Argentina   x  www.utal.org 
Armenia   x  IFS 
Azerbaijan    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Bangladesh    x  ADB (for trade partners) 
Belarus      
Benin   x  UN 
Bhutan    x  ADB (for trade partners) 
Bolivia   x  IFS 
Bosnia and Herzegovina       
Botswana    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Brazil   x  www.utal.org 
Bulgaria   x  IFS 
Burkina Faso    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Burundi   x  IFS 
Cambodia    x  ADB (for trade partners) 
Cameroon   x IFS 
Central African Republic    x  IFS 
Chad   x   
Chile   x  IFS 
China   x  IFS 
Colombia   x  IFS 
Congo, Dem. Rep.       
  27Congo, Rep.    x   
Costa Rica    x  IFS 
Cote d’Ivoire    x  IFS 
Croatia   x  IFS 
Czech Republic       
Djibouti      
Ecuador   x  IFS 
Egypt, Arab Rep.    x   
El Salvador    x  www.utal.org 
Equatorial Guinea       
Eritrea      
Estonia   x   
Ethiopia    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Gabon   x  IFS 
Gambia, The    x  IFS 
Georgia   x  
Ghana   x  IFS 
Guatemala   x  www.utal.org 
Guinea   x  IFS 
Honduras   x  www.utal.org 
Hungary   x  IFS 
India   x   
Indonesia   x   
Iran, Islamic Rep.    x  IFS 
Iraq      
Jordan   x   
Kazakhstan    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Kenya   x   
Korea, Dem. Rep.       
Kyrgyz Republic    x   
Lao PDR    x   
Latvia   x  Eurostat 
Lebanon      
Lesotho   x  IFS 
Liberia      
Libya      
Lithuania   x  Eurostat 
Macedonia, FYR    x  IFS 
Madagascar    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Malawi   x  IFS 
Malaysia   x  IFS 
Mali    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Mauritania    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Mayotte      
Mexico    x  Banco de Mexico 
Moldova   x  IFS 
Mongolia    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Morocco   x  IFS 
Mozambique    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Myanmar      
  28Namibia      
Nepal   x  ADB 
Nicaragua   x IFS 
Niger    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Nigeria   x  IFS 
Northern Mariana Islands       
Oman   x   
Pakistan   x  IFS 
Panama   x  www.utal.org 
Paraguay   x  IFS 
Peru   x  www.utal.org 
Philippines   x  IFS 
Poland   x  IFS 
Romania   x  IFS 
Russian Federation    x  IFS 
Rwanda    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Saudi Arabia    x  IFS 
Senegal    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Serbia and Montenegro       
Sierra Leone    x  IFS 
Slovak Republic    x  IFS 
Somalia      
South Africa       
Sri Lanka    x   
Sudan   x   
Swaziland      
Syrian Arab Republic    x   
Tajikistan      
Tanzania      
Thailand   x   
Togo   x  IFS 
Tunisia   x  IFS 
Turkey   x  Eurostat 
Turkmenistan      
Uganda   x  IFS 
Ukraine      
Uruguay   x  IFS 
Uzbekistan      
Venezuela, RB    x  IFS 
Vietnam      
West Bank and Gaza       
Yemen, Rep.    x  UN (for trade partners) 
Zambia   x  IFS 
Zimbabwe    x  UN (for trade partners) 
 
Notes on Table Entries:   
1) UN represents World Statistics Pocketbook, Small Island Developing States, New York: 
United Nations, 2003 or World Statistics Pocketbook, Least Developed Countries, New York: 
United Nations, 2003.  These sources were consulted to obtain information on trading partners in 
  29order to compute an effective exchange rate index.  In addition to trading partner information, we 
used exchange rate data from IFS and price series from WDI.   
2)  IFS:  International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.  If this source is listed, 
we are using REER as reported/constructed by the International Monetary Fund.   
3)  www.focuseconomics.com.au , Eurostat, www.utal.org, Banco de Mexico are sources for 
published real exchange rate data.   
4)  ADB represents Key Indicators, Asian Development Bank, and was used to get trading 
partner information . http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2006/default.asp   
  30